Challenges and confusion in media and communication regulation: a four country comparison. by Hannu, Nieminen et al.
Original Citation:
Challenges and confusion in media and communication regulation: a four country comparison.
Routledge
Publisher:
Published version:
DOI:
Terms of use:
Open Access
(Article begins on next page)
This article is made available under terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Guidelines, as described at
http://www.unipd.it/download/file/fid/55401 (Italian only)
Availability:
This version is available at: 11577/2837338 since: 2016-11-28T16:50:17Z
Università degli Studi di Padova
Padua Research Archive - Institutional Repository
10 Challenges and Confusion in 
Media Regulation
A Four-Country Comparison
Hannu Nieminen, Alessandro D’Arma, 
Claudia Padovani and Helena Sousa
INTRoDUCTIoN
In this chapter we discuss recent developments and challenges in European 
media and communication policy, focusing on the period following the 2008 
global financial crisis. We are especially interested in the implications of the 
financial crisis and its political repercussions nationally (austerity measures 
and cuts to public services, growing anti-politics sentiments and widespread 
dissatisfaction with free-market capitalism and representative democracy) 
for media and communication policy, understood here in a broad sense, so 
as to include all electronic communications, such as the Internet, mobile 
communications, social media etc. Our overarching concern is with the 
implications of developments in media and communication policy for the 
democratic functions of the media in Europe.
We ask whether there is any evidence for the notion that the macro-
economic and political conditions of recent years have contributed to a 
reorientation of prevalent approaches to media and communications pol-
icy in Europe. There are three aspects to this. Our main question considers 
whether there has been a shift away from the neoliberal values that influ-
enced European media policy for much of the past three decades. We are 
also interested in determining whether the crisis has led the EU to use the 
opportunity to increase its powers and control within media and commu-
nications policy over the sovereignty of its member states. Finally, we ask if 
there are any signs of the 2008 crisis directly influencing different media and 
communications policy areas. In our analysis we concentrate specifically on 
three issues drawn from different policy areas: public subsidies (or state aid) 
to media content providers; protection of minors in the new technological 
environment; and national broadband policies.
Has there been a move away from neoliberal values emphasising free 
markets over state intervention and freedom of expression over regulation 
to protect social values and vulnerable groups? This could be said to be 
underway if we were to establish that public subsidies to media content-
providers have at least been maintained at previous levels in spite of the 
financial crisis constraining state budgets; policy-makers have taken con-
crete actions involving new regulations to address growing societal concerns 
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for the safety of our children in the online environment; substantial public 
money has been allocated in deploying the national broadband infrastruc-
ture, with a view to achieving the goal of universal service.
In the same manner, an increase in EU control of media and communica-
tions policy over national sovereignty can be established if the EU Member 
States now have less sovereignty to decide on public subsidies to media and 
communications-providers than they had before the crisis; there are increas-
ingly pan-European legal standards for the protection of minors in the 
digital media environment; there is a unified European broadband policy, 
decreed and implemented by the EU with the assistance of its member states. 
Accordingly, we will search for signs of the direct influence of the 2008 crisis 
in the three policy areas.
We will attempt to find indications as to whether the abovementioned 
conditions exist by placing our empirical focus primarily (though not exclu-
sively) on four western European countries with different media policy 
traditions (Hallin and Mancini, 2004): two small countries (Finland and 
Portugal) and two large ones (Italy and the United Kingdom), the size of 
a country being in turn a relevant variable in media policy (cf. Just and 
 Puppis, 2012). In addition, and arguably more importantly for our pur-
poses, there are differences in the degree to which these four countries have 
felt the impact of the global financial crisis on their national economies, the 
two southern European countries having being engulfed in a deeper eco-
nomic recession and more political turmoil than either Finland or the UK.
In what follows, we will explore in more detail the three areas of media 
policy and assess their development in Finland, Portugal, Italy and the UK.
PUBLIC FUNDINg AND STATE AID To MEDIA
Public financing has been a fundamental means of supporting the media in 
post-war Europe, especially during the first three post-war decades char-
acterized almost everywhere by licence-fee-funded public-service broad-
casting monopolies (cf. Humphreys, 1996).1 Even after the introduction of 
commercial television in the 1980s and 1990s throughout much of Europe, 
public financing continued to play an important, and in some cases a pre-
dominant, role within national media environments. Here we will focus on 
public funding to support news media organizations, namely broadcasters 
and newspaper publishers. They have been the primary destination of the 
public money channelled into the media, largely due to the major contribu-
tion they are expected to make to the democratic process as the main source 
of political information and commentary on issues of public relevance in 
contemporary societies. But it should be noted that other media producers 
(e.g. film companies, animation studios, documentary-makers and video-
game developers) often benefit from substantial amounts of public money 
obtained through various mechanisms (cf. Grant and Wood, 2004; Gibbons 
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and Humphreys, 2011), not least through public-service broadcasting itself, 
whose remit, of course, includes not only news and current affairs provision 
but also provision in popular entertainment genres and support for domes-
tic film and audiovisual industries.
Unlike licence-fee-funded broadcasting in post-war Europe, newspapers, 
while recognized as serving the public interest, were initially not state- 
subsidized, as this was interpreted as a potentially distortive influence on 
press freedom. However, in the 1960s and 1970s, when the newspaper sec-
tor showed its first signs of decline, several countries adopted public poli-
cies to support the press with the stated aim of promoting a diversity of 
titles and viewpoints (Murschetz, 1998; Humphreys, 2006). Different forms 
of press subsidies were introduced and have operated within Europe ever 
since, including both untied and earmarked subsidies (e.g. for delivery); 
targeted subsidies for special purposes (e.g. to support party newspapers); 
tax reductions and VAT exemptions; and reduced postal tariffs. There have 
been considerable national variations within Europe in the modalities and 
extent of press subsidies, reflecting, as put by Peter Humphreys (2006, 
p.  39), “national political, economic and cultural characteristics.” While 
providing indirect subsidies to the whole sector (e.g. preferential rates of 
VAT) has been commonplace throughout the EU, direct selective subsidies 
have tended to be adopted only in countries characterized by either strong 
welfare and social democratic traditions (such as the Nordic countries) or 
strong state-interventionist traditions (southern Europe), while more liberal-
oriented countries, like the UK, have eschewed them.
These various forms of subsidy schemes in favour of the press have always 
sat rather uneasily with the EU’s single market policy. According to EU treaties, 
state aid is not permissible when it distorts competition.2 On this basis, there 
has been growing pressure on EU member states to suspend their various sub-
sidy schemes (e.g. CEC, 2009; generally on EU press policy see  Lichtenberg, 
2008; Hutchinson, 2007). The case of public-service broadcasting, however, 
is different. While funding public-service broadcasting also qualifies as state 
aid from the EU’s perspective, the Protocol on Public Broadcasting to the 
EU Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 recognized that public-service broadcasting is 
“directly related to the democratic, social and cultural needs of each society,”3 
and accorded member states the freedom to fund public-service broadcasting 
providing the compensation is proportionate to their public service remit.
Notwithstanding this authoritative source of legitimation, life has been 
far from assured for public-service broadcasters (PSBs) around Europe dur-
ing the past twenty years. For instance, the European Commission’s 2009 
Communication on State Aid to Public Service Broadcasters was character-
ized by what has been described as a more restrictive approach to PSBs’ 
online expansion than was previously the case (Brevini, 2013; see also 
Donders and Moe, 2012). Overall, however, it is fair to say the institution 
of public-service broadcasting has shown remarkable resilience in Europe, 
especially considering the set of challenges it has faced over a long period.
166 H. Nieminen, A. D’Arma, C. Padovani and H. Sousa
Prior to the global financial crisis of 2008, the challenge to the PSBs was pri-
marily an ideological one, based on a technologically driven argument force-
fully put forward by rival commercial interests and their political backers. 
Simply put, the argument has been that technological advances, most notably 
new delivery technologies such as digital broadcasting and the Internet, by 
eroding barriers to entry also remove the main market failures associated with 
television and thus undermine the rationale for significant public intervention 
in the form of large stand-alone publicly funded organizations. Even more 
vociferously, commercial rivals have accused PSBs of crowding out private 
provision by entering new media sectors where there are no apparent market 
failures justifying their presence. In many parts of Europe, notably southern 
and eastern European countries (though by no means only there), PSBs con-
tinue to be widely perceived as overly politicized, biased and wasteful organi-
zations, failing in important respects to fulfil their public service remit.
Since the 2008 global economic crisis, the argument against public-service 
broadcasting has been presented, especially in those parts of Europe worst 
affected by the crisis, in more pragmatic, almost fatalistic, terms. Indeed, it is 
argued that European societies facing a prolonged economic downturncan 
can simply no longer afford the luxury of funding PSBs, and the political 
pressure for smaller, scaled-down PSBs is mounting (cf. Lowe and Berg, 2013; 
Snoddy, 2013). The second half of 2013 saw the unprecedented closure of 
two southern European public broadcasters, the Greek ERT (replaced by a 
new, scaled-back organization) and RàdioTelevisió Valenciana (RTVV), one 
of Spain’s regional public broadcasters. Several other PSBs, including those 
in continental and northern Europe, have had severe funding cuts inflicted, 
which has led to drastic downsizing.
This also applies to the BBC in the UK – in comparative terms, a PSB 
 traditionally enjoying a strong level of political support. However, the cor-
poration has been under increasing political pressure in recent times after 
a series of managerial blunders. The BBC Charter is due for renewal in 
2017, and it is widely expected the government will use this opportunity to 
narrow the BBC’s public service remit and to continue the financial freeze 
announced in 2010 that amounts to a sixteen per cent real-terms cut in BBC 
funds by 2017. The financial squeeze has already forced the BBC to reduce 
investment levels and the range of services it provides.
In Italy, in recent years RAI’s licence fee has been allowed to increase in 
line with inflation. However, it remains low by comparative standards and is 
widely evaded (over one in four Italians do not pay it). During the same period, 
RAI’s advertising revenues have been in free fall, in the context of the country’s 
economic recession. Thus RAI is facing severe financial pressures, given its 
historic dependence on commercial revenue, with the situation worsened by 
the decision to freeze RAI’s licence fee for 2014. As in Italy, in Portugal the PSB 
RTP has historically been underfinanced and has experienced difficult times 
recently, amid talk of privatisation (eventually rejected) and a new funding 
deal announced in late 2013 that further reduces its already meagre budget.
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There are exceptions to this rather bleak scenario for public-service 
broadcasting in Europe. One is Finland, which was one of the first European 
countries to move from a licence-based financing system to a (generous) 
wholly tax-based system in 2013. To prevent the government from inter-
vening in the use of this income, the tax is collected in a separate fund used 
exclusively to finance public broadcaster Yle.4 The new financing model has 
arguably strengthened the overall position of Yle, not only financially but 
also in terms of public trust.
In the case of press subsidies, there has been a clear trend towards the 
gradual reduction, or even the complete abandonment, of subsidy schemes 
in Europe (Murschetz and Trappel, 2014). The reduction in press subsidies, 
however, predates the financial crisis of 2008–2009. Finland, historically 
one of the European countries with the most extensive system of press sub-
sidies, slashed almost all direct state aid to newspapers in 2007; the only 
significant remaining form of subsidy is a reduced VAT rate for print news-
papers (cf. Lehtisaari, et al., 2012). Therefore, Finland’s approach to press 
subsidies now appears more restrained than even the UK’s, where the only 
form of state aid to the press is the VAT exemption.
Like Finland, Italy and Portugal have a long tradition of subsidizing 
the press, but in recent years they have reduced levels of support. In Italy, 
relatively substantial press subsidies have remained in place, although the 
system was simplified and the level of support decreased in 2012.5 The con-
clusions of a recent comparative study on public support for news media, 
which included the UK, Finland and Italy, was that direct subsidies to the 
press were becoming less common, and that in any case, they are less sig-
nificant than indirect forms of support (i.e. VAT exemptions or reductions). 
The latter are “a much more significant form of public support for the media 
than is commonly realized, worth hundreds of millions of euros per year.” 
(Nielsen, 2011, p. 4) Another significant finding related to the lack of inno-
vation in public-funding policies, and the author remarked on the lack of 
public-sector support for online-only media organizations.
Since the adoption of the European State Aid legislation in the late 1960s 
(cf. Thomas, 2000) there has been pressure for a unitary application of this 
policy in the area of media and communication. Although the EU State Aid 
policy is officially based on an economic argument – that public subsidies 
interfere with the free market principle – there is obviously a strong ide-
ological influence of neoliberalism, which aims to deny the public-service 
principle and approaches media content merely as a commodity.
From the viewpoint of the EU versus nation states, it seems that, based 
on the Lisbon Treaty (2007) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (2010), the EU can use its powers to overcome the sover-
eignty of the nation states in relation to the positive content regulation, at 
least in the form of public subsidies. However, the member states still have 
some means to defend their traditional state aid policies, if they choose to 
use them.
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PRoTECTIoN oF MINoRS
Public debates on the need to tackle the dangers children face when using 
audiovisual media started in the UK and Finland as early as the 1960s. 
Initially focused on film and television, concerns are now widespread and 
linked to the digitalization of the media, especially the Internet, social-media 
platforms and game cultures. Inviting regulatory responses nowadays are 
issues such as grooming and paedophilia, pornography, excessive violence, 
advertisements aimed at minors, cyber-bullying, the presentation of children 
in the media and game dependency.
At the EU level, the protection of minors is addressed in the  Audiovisual 
Media Services Directive (2007, Articles 27 and 12)6 and E-commerce 
Directive (2000). The European Commission does not monitor programmes 
on an individual basis but rather indicates a minimum set of common 
rules covering aspects such as advertising and protection of minors in the 
 ‘single European TV market’ (Directive 2010/13/EU7), while monitoring the 
performance of member states in general. At the same time, the EU has 
formulated strategies to deal with the particular needs and vulnerabilities 
of minors using the Internet, with the aim of making the Internet a place 
of opportunities where children can access knowledge, communicate and 
develop their skills. One such initiative, part of the EU Digital Agenda, is the 
Strategy for a Better Internet for Children (COM/2012/0196 final),8 which 
proposes a series of actions to be undertaken by the Commission, member 
states and the whole industry. Also relevant are initiatives like the Safer 
Internet Forum,9 an annual EU-supported international conference where 
different actors come together to discuss the latest trends, risks and solutions 
related to children’s online safety, and projects such as EU Kids Online,10 a 
multinational thematic network that aims to stimulate and  co-ordinate the 
many nation-based investigations into children’s online uses, activities, risks 
and safety.
A strong emphasis on industry self-regulation arguably  characterizes 
the EU approach to minors’ protection,11 while the implementation 
clearly remains the responsibility of the individual member states, where 
such responsibilities are shared, to differing degrees, by public authorities, 
audiovisual industries, Internet service-providers, education professionals 
and parents. At the national level, we can draw a distinction between ‘hard 
instruments’ (legislation and technical tools) and ‘soft means’  (information 
and education, support for parental guidance) in the protection of minors. 
In the four countries observed in this study, it appears there are significant 
differences in arranging the protection of minors, both in regulatory terms 
and in relation to the crucial role of parents in supporting/accompanying 
children.
According to a recent EU Kids Online12 study on children’s online risks 
and parenting practices across Europe, Finland, together with other Nordic 
countries, belongs to a group of countries where minors can be defined as 
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‘supported risky explorers.’ The underlying assumption is that minors can-
not be effectively protected from exposure to unwanted content, hence a 
major role is envisioned for educators and parents, since instead of adopt-
ing restrictions to content, the focus is on strengthening trust relationships 
between minors and educators. Consistently, in Finland the emphasis is on 
‘soft means’ such as information campaigns and media education.
Regarding the anticipated harm resulting from exposure to unwanted 
content, Finnish statistics show there is no evidence that bullying in general, 
and online bullying specifically, has increased among adolescents in the past 
ten years. A long-term trend of about five per cent of children having experi-
enced bullying, either through social media or by other means, has remained 
stable over time (cf. Jokiranta, 2008; Luopa, Pietikäinen and Jokela, 2008). 
In contrast to the Finnish approach, according to the same EU Kids Online 
study, the other three countries – the UK, Portugal and Italy – belong to a 
group where minors are ‘protected by restrictions.’ In these cases, Internet 
use is limited, and largely restricted to practical activities. Such restrictive 
mediation may prevent risks, but it may also lead to children missing out on 
online opportunities.
In Italy, we find a mix of measures, with an emphasis on legally enforced co-
regulation. The Code of Auto-Regulation of Media and Minors,13 concerned 
with both minors’ representation and exposure to content, was adopted in 
2002, signed by all public and private television companies, and became a law 
(112/2004) to which all audiovisual content-providers are subject.
Since 2006 (law 38/2006), all Italian Internet service-providers are 
required to indicate unlawful activities and obliged to institute filtering 
mechanisms to prevent access to sites and materials containing child por-
nography. Implementing the law is the responsibility of the National  Centre 
to Counter Paedopornography (Postal Police)14 and the Observatory to 
Counter Paedophilia and Pornography of Minors (Department of Equal 
Opportunities of the Presidency of Ministers)15. Growing concern in the 
country also relates to bullying on social networking sites, especially due 
to tragic events involving teenagers committing suicide that have attracted 
public and media attention since the end of 2013.
Such an issue is also of great public concern in the UK. Followings sev-
eral cases of teenagers committing suicide after being subjected to online 
bullying, there have been calls to introduce legislation to criminalize cyber-
bullying. Under current UK legislation there is no specific law that makes 
cyber-bullying illegal but, according to experts, it can be considered a crimi-
nal offence under legislation such as the Protection from Harassment Act 
and the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act.16
The Conservative British Prime Minister recently announced a 
“war” against online pornography, describing it a corrosive influence on 
 childhood.17 British plans to fight child pornography include requiring 
Internet service-providers to introduce family-friendly filters as default 
options on domestic Internet connections (the so-called opt-in policy, to 
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be implemented by the end of 2014), and criminalizing the possession of 
extreme pornography, which includes scenes of simulated rape. The plans 
have been heavily criticized both on practical grounds (for being technically 
impossible to implement) and on substantive grounds (by libertarians).
In Portugal, considerable attention has been paid to the representation 
of minors in the media. The state media regulatory body, the ERC, created 
in 2005, systematically monitors television content that represents minors. 
According to Article 34, Number 1, of the Television Act, all TV broadcasters 
must comply with “the observance of broadcasting ethics that ensures respect 
for human dignity, for fundamental rights and other constitutional values, 
especially the development of children and adolescents’ personality.” In a 
recent report, the ERC found that in 2009–2010, approximately sixty per cent 
of the items monitored on television did not use any concealment technique to 
protect the identity of the children or young people shown (ERC, 2011, p. 46).
To protect children, in 2006 television broadcasters adopted a self- 
regulatory agreement regarding the classification of programmes,18 with the 
main goal of providing consumers with a guide to television programming 
appropriate for children’s ages and of providing educators with guidelines 
on programme viewing. Episodic initiatives are also taken by the regulatory 
body in different domains, such as hate speech or exposure to extreme vio-
lence, based on individual complaints. Nevertheless, mechanisms of restraint 
created by the operators for the prevention of specific situations seem inad-
equate and ineffective. ‘Soft’ measures are also adopted, as demonstrated 
by a resolution of the Assembly of the Republic of Portugal in 2008, which 
recommended the promotion of a national campaign to encourage aware-
ness and prevent the risks children face when using the Internet.19
The protection of minors is high on the public agenda in all four countries. 
The rapid diffusion of media technologies and the liberalization of online 
commercial activities are challenging traditional media regulation, and there 
is a significant difference in the approaches adopted by public authorities. In 
Finland, ‘soft’ measures such as education, providing information and self- 
and co-regulation are preferred; in the other three countries, it appears the 
emphasis is on restrictive policies and statutory regulation. Here, different 
national and cultural traditions clearly narrow the EU’s influence and restrict 
its influence in monitoring and informational activities. It seems obvious 
that more and in-depth research is needed to increase our understanding 
of the real challenges and opportunities minors are confronted with in the 
digital environment, to inform governing arrangements and to determine an 
adequate balance between ‘soft’ and ‘restrictive’ measures.
BRoADBAND RoLL-oUT
The promotion of a high-speed broadband network is one of the EU’s main 
targets as part of its Digital Agenda 2020. The main motivation is that, 
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according to the EU, “it is estimated that a 10% increase in broadband 
penetration brings up the GDP by 1–1.5%.” 20 The targets for full European 
coverage were set by the EU in 2010 as follows:
•	 “Basic broadband for all citizens by 2013 (target met – satellite 
broadband is available to raise the coverage to 100 per cent in 
every Member State);
•	 Coverage: Next Generation Networks (NGN) (30 Mbps or more) 
for all by 2020;
•	 Uptake: 50 per cent of households having 100 Mbps subscriptions 
or higher.”21
The EU strategy is largely based on the expectation that the goals will be 
met by commercial operators, who will, by 2020, offer almost universal 
high-speed connectivity in Europe, both to companies and households. Only 
where there is a clearly defined market failure (i.e. high-speed connections 
are not commercially viable) will public subsidies be deployed.22 Even then, 
state aid can be applied only if approved beforehand by the EU.23
The EU is constantly monitoring the implementation of the European 
high-speed broadband policy,24 and provides recommendations on its 
 execution to the member states.25 However, despite the EU’s attempts to co-
ordinate the rollout, there are major differences, both between the countries 
and within the countries. For example, while connectivity is almost univer-
sal in some of the EU’s northern member states (the Netherlands,  Denmark), 
it remains much less advanced in many southern members (Romania, 
Greece). Meanwhile, in many urban centres the availability of connections 
of 100 Mbps or more is abundant, while rural areas often still lack even 
basic connections.26 Additionally, the EU member states differ widely in 
their geographies and levels of urbanization, with the effect that the costs of 
constructing networks differ hugely. The more sparsely populated the areas 
and the more demanding the geographical conditions, the less commercially 
viable the construction of the network.27
In Finland, although the promotion of high-speed broadband is a govern-
mental priority, there has been very little public effort deployed to promote 
its implementation effectively. In 2008, the government adopted a two-stage 
broadband strategy, according to which by summer 2010, a connection of 
1Mbps became a universal service obligation, binding all network operators 
to offering an affordable Internet connection to all potential customers in 
their market area. By 2015, a 100 Mbps connection was to be made avail-
able to every household.28 The strategy was proclaimed as market-led, as 
only the connection of five per cent of the most remote households and 
companies was to be supported by public subsidies (requiring a total of 
€66-million).
The implementation was left therefore to commercial operators, except 
for the five per cent in which regional and local authorities were engaged. 
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There was very little further national guidance available, and no central co-
ordination. The state aid was granted only retrospectively, which forced the 
local and regional actors (municipalities, small companies, co- operatives) to 
engage in complicated negotiations on bank loans to finance the network 
construction (cf. Nieminen, 2013). By autumn 2013, two interim assess-
ments had allowed stakeholders to voice their concerns.29 As part of this 
process, the Regional Mayor of the Regional Council of Southwest  Finland 
(the country’s second largest council), Juho Savo, stated the strategy had 
failed totally and the responsibility lay with the Ministry of Transport 
and Communications and its reliance on the market. The problem is that 
the network operators are only interested in building 4G networks in the 
densely populated areas that promise quick profits, rather than investing in 
the fibre-optic broadband that will take several years to produce a profit.30
In Italy, the National Plan for the Development of Broadband31 was 
adopted in 2010, based on previous laws in 2009 and 2010 stipulating 
the administrative and financial provisions.32 The goal was to eliminate 
the digital divide by 2013 – which in 2008 still involved more than eight 
million Italians – mainly through the development of infrastructures (with 
ADSL connections and, in the most remote areas, also through satellite 
 technologies), and to bring broadband to the whole population with a con-
nection speed of between 2 and 20 Mbps. The plan was amended in July 
2013 when Telecom, the Italian incumbent operator, received an authoriza-
tion from the national regulatory authority (AGCOM) to offer fibre-optic 
30 Mbps  connections nationally.
Despite the activity of public authorities, the rollout of high-speed broad-
band has been less successful than hoped. The Italian country evaluation in 
the EU Digital Scoreboard 2013 reveals a generally problematic situation. 
“Italy has a relatively low take-up of fixed broadband and a low avail-
ability of Next Generation Access. The share of high-speed connections (at 
least 30 Mbps) is significantly lower than average. Nevertheless, in mobile 
broadband, take-up on large screens remains above average. Italy should 
foster further the investment in infrastructure in order to increase the avail-
ability of high-speed broadband.”33
The national broadband policy in Portugal has changed quite consider-
ably since 2011 under the direction of the neoliberal post-troika coalition 
led by Pedro Passos Coelho. The previous socialist governments of 2005–
2011 developed an ambitious technological plan,34 but this was suspended 
in 2011. In line with the Lisbon Agenda, the socialists aimed at developing a 
knowledge-based economy, with the promotion of high-speed broadband as 
an important dimension. There was a belief in business innovation and on 
overcoming scientific and technological backwardness. Several programmes 
were actually implemented, such as Ligar Portugal/Connecting Portugal,35 
with the aim of promoting Portugal to the top five countries in terms of the 
technological modernization of schools through the expansion of Internet 
use for students and teachers. Despite the political disputes caused by some 
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initiatives (the one-laptop-per-child Magalhães programme was probably 
the most controversial), the socialists’ technological plan democratized the 
Internet in an unprecedented way for the middle classes.
However, the Lisbon Agenda demanded resources and a political will that 
were simply impossible to achieve after the troika intervention in  Portugal. 
Since then, the promotion of a high-speed broadband network has been left to 
market operators. The EU Digital Scoreboard 2013 states that Portugal “has 
a relatively low take-up of fixed broadband, but does considerably better than 
average regarding the availability of Next Generation Access. In mobile broad-
band, take-up is lower than average but LTE36 availability is relatively high.”37
In the UK, the coalition government that took office in 2010 set the objec-
tive of having the best superfast broadband network in Europe by the end of 
the parliamentary term (by spring 2015 at the latest). The rollout of broad-
band and superfast broadband networks (at least 30Mbps) has been mostly 
market-led38 and driven by private investment. In the words of the govern-
ment minister Jeremy Hunt during the summer of 2010: “(…) When it comes 
to superfast broadband, there is no question that the market must lead the 
way. …”39 Additional public funding has been made available by both the 
government and local authorities to ensure superfast broadband reaches some 
of the most rural and hard-to-cover areas (the ‘final third of the country’).
Thus far, the government is committed to investing £1.6-billion of public 
funds to extend superfast broadband to ninety-five per cent of premises by 
2017.40 With regard to mobile networks, licensing and regulatory obliga-
tions representing a policy tool used to achieve public interest goals (i.e. the 
universality of service). The national regulator Ofcom has included coverage 
obligations in one of the 4G spectrum licences for mobile networks in an 
effort to ensure near universal availability of broadband. This will provide 
indoor coverage to ninety-eight per cent of consumers at speeds of 2Mbps 
by 2017, with at least ninety-five per cent coverage being provided in each 
of the UK home nations.
The UK national target for fixed broadband networks is for superfast 
broadband coverage of at least ninety per cent by 2016 and ninety-five per 
cent by 2017. Currently, the government is exploring options with indus-
try as to how to extend coverage to ninety-nine per cent. However, there 
is increasing public criticism of the implementation of the government’s 
broadband policy, especially in rural areas. The claim is that when promot-
ing a practical monopoly of only one incumbent company, British Telecom 
(BT), the government has neglected supervision of the execution. According 
to the critics, BT has not provided the connections and services promised.41
According to the evaluation of the EU Digital Scoreboard 2013, “The 
United Kingdom has a relatively high take-up of fixed broadband and does 
considerably better than average regarding the availability of Next Generation 
Access. In mobile broadband, the take-up is one of the highest in the EU.”42
The rapid expansion of the high-speed broadband network in Europe 
involves one of the EU’s major industrial and technological initiatives, its 
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Digital Agenda for Europe 2020. The main expected benefits are industrial 
and commercial, while it is anticipated it will bring about significant sav-
ings in the public service areas of health care, education, social services, etc. 
From this perspective, the use of the broadband network for information 
and media services is auxiliary, and this use is only promoted providing it 
advances the broadband network’s rapid deployment.
The problem is that although the Digital Agenda for Europe covers all 
member countries, its success depends on national resources. Here, the 
neoliberal ideology and the EU State Aid policy create a hindrance. As the 
evidence from our four countries clearly indicates, and contrary to the expec-
tations of EU policy, the high-speed network cannot be created on a purely 
commercial basis. The commercial network operators are not willing to 
invest in the networks unless they view them as profitable, and this restricts 
their interest to densely populated regions, cities and suburban areas.
From the viewpoint of the relationship between the EU and its mem-
ber states, the situation appears to have reached a stalemate. The nation 
states cannot use their own resources, even if they had them, because of 
the EU’s State Aid policy, while the EU does not have power over national 
markets.
CoNCLUSIoNS
The four country cases do not provide a basis for firm conclusions.  However, 
we will offer here some thoughts and suggestions for further policy research.
on the Europeanisation of Media and  
Communication Policy
Our examples seem to confirm there is no unitary European policy in the 
areas of media and communication; instead, there are different policies in 
different policy areas. First, in the case of the protection of minors, the com-
petence of the EU is based on two directives, the Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive and the E-commerce Directive. Issues other than those covered 
by these directives belong to the national sovereignty of EU member states.
With regard to public information about the protection of minors and 
media education, the role of the EU is that of a co-ordinator of national 
policies and promoter of good practices, while responsibility for the practi-
cal implementation lies with national authorities. Furthermore, there is a 
major cultural divide in Europe concerning the understanding of how best 
to protect minors from unwanted media content. In northern Europe, the 
emphasis is on information and education, while countries in central and 
southern Europe stress control and restrictions.
Secondly, concerning state aid to media, the EU applies a strict market-
based policy, according to which public subsidies are permitted only in the case 
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of significant market failure. On the level of EU member states, we can identify 
a clear push towards a unified European policy in relation to the media. In the 
case of newspapers, although a number of EU member states practise a policy 
of VAT exemption for the press, there appears to be increasing pressure to 
streamline state aid policy along the EU official line and to stop all direct and 
indirect forms of subsidies. In contrast, in the case of public- service broadcast-
ing, the EU has guaranteed national sovereignty to its member states in how 
the fundingis arranged, provided it fulfils the general conditions stipulated 
originally in the Amsterdam protocol of 1997. As a result, there is traditionally 
a large variety of funding arrangements, ranging from tax-based (Finland) to a 
combination of licence fees and advertising (Italy).
Thirdly, the roll-out of high-speed broadband is part of the EU’s flag-
ship Digital Agenda 2020 programme, which set numerical targets for 2020 
that member states are expected to fulfil. The execution of these targets is 
left to the member states. There are, however, wide differences between the 
member states’ financial and technological competences. Additionally, there 
is a lack of effective European-level co-ordination of the implementation. 
As the target was originally to be achieved by market operators – private 
telecommunications companies – state aid was to be used only to cover the 
construction of the network in commercially non-viable areas. However, it 
has been clear during the process of implementation that this market-driven 
policy will not be sufficient to reach the EU’s 2020 target.
on the Effects of the 2008 Crisis  
on Media Policy and Regulation
It is difficult to offer general conclusions based on the evidence presented in 
this chapter. However, in relation to the issue of the protection of minors, it 
may be possible to state that the financial crisis and increasing competition 
has led the content and service industries to lower their ethical standards. 
Additionally, the enhanced possibilities offered by Web2.0 and different 
social media applications have arguably led content-providers to supersede 
national and European regulatory mechanisms, and as a result expose chil-
dren to uncontrolled and unmonitored content.
In relation to state aid for the media, it may be possible to claim that 
as a product of the crisis, there seems to be political ambivalence between 
the ideological imperatives of neoliberal policies and the dire reality of the 
media industries. According to neoliberalist policy doctrines, public subsi-
dies to the media should be rejected, but both European creative industries 
and the European socio-political stability apparently continue to require 
public subsidies if they are to survive.
The same is true of high-speed broadband policy. From the viewpoint of 
the future of European industry and trade, Europe needs an effective high-
speed broadband network as soon as possible. The problem is that, contrary 
to the ideological policy doctrine, the markets have not been able to provide 
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it as expected, and in this regard the application of more public subsidies 
starts to become a necessary alternative.
on the Necessity of a New Balance between  
Commercial and Democratic Needs
Based on our comparison, it appears there is an increased need to find a new 
balance in media and communication policy between economic interests and 
democratic, social and cultural needs. There is currently much confusion as 
to how to (re)construct this balance in the new converging environment, 
and the long-lasting effects of the crisis that began in 2008 do not make this 
task any easier. One way of interpreting the situation is that we should not 
expect the EU to solve the problems on the level of a common European 
communication policy. Instead, what looks like confusion can be seen as a 
variety of different contexts and problem-solving-oriented approaches, leav-
ing room for the EU members to implement national resolutions. However, 
one clear conclusion seems to arise from our analysis: the recognition that 
the state still matters. Our examples indicate that at least in the areas we 
discussed, the EU has not been able or willing to form a pan-European regu-
latory framework for all media and communications.
This may be because the European financial crisis has led to a deepen-
ing social and political polarization, the results of which will only become 
apparent later. However, this perspective appears set to complicate all Euro-
pean policy issues well into the future.
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